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The institutional system of the European 
Communities  is  difficult  to  classify.  The 
Community is much more than an inter-
governmental  organization:  its  Institu-
tions  have  a  definite  legal  status  and 
extensive  powers  of their own.  But nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  it  a  "federal 
government"  with  the  national  govern-
ments and parliaments subordinate to it in 
the spheres of  its jurisdiction. It  is perhaps 
safest to be non-committal and leave it to 
future  historians  to  fit  the  system  into 
one or other of the international lawyers' 
categories, ourselves saying simply that it 
is a "Community" system. 
Note:  the  values  in  dollars  shown  in  this  document 
refer  to  periods  mainly  prior  to  the  devaluation  of  the 
US  dollar. They should therefore be taken in terms of the 
parity  of  that  currency  before  December  1971,  and  are 
formally equivalent to the  European  Community's  unit of 
account defined as  0.888671  grammes of fine gold. 
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11 The four Institutions 
The merger of the Institutions of the three  Communities, 
from July 1967, did not appreciably affect the structure and 
competence of the European Parliament and the Court of 
Justice, which already served all three. On the other hand, 
a single Commission superseded the High Authority of the 
ECSC  and the  Common  Market and Euratom Commis-
sions, and a single Council of Ministers the ECSC, Common 
Market  and  Euratom  Councils.  The  single  Council  and 
single Commission exercise all the powers and responsibili-
ties formerly vested in their respective predecessors, in the 
same way  and in accordance with  the same rules,  as  laid 
down in the three Treaties. 
The merger of the Institutions is no more than a first step 
towards  the  setting-up of a  single  European Community, 
governed  by  a  single  Treaty  which  will  replace  the Paris 
Treaty  (establishing  the  ECSC)  and  the  Rome  Treaties 
(establishing the Common Market and Euratom). 
The work of the Communities is thus discharged by four 
Institutions - the  European Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
Commission and the Court of Justice. 
The  Parliament  consists  at  present  of  142  members. 
appointed by the six national parliaments from among their 
own members. 
The Court consists at present of seven judges appointed for 
terms of six  years  by  the common consent of the govern-
ments, who see to it that the action taken to implement the 
Treaties is  in accordance with the rule of law. 
The Council is made up of the representatives of the govern-
ments of the member states, each government sending one 
of its ministers. Its membership may thus vary according to 
the  matter up for  consideration:  the  Foreign  Minister  is 
regarded in a sense as his country's "main" representative 
on the Council, but Council meetings are often attended by 
the Ministers of Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Industry 
and so  on,  either  on their  own  or alongside  the  Foreign 
Minister. 
The merger of the Councils was a very limited operation, 
to a great extent merely endorsing a state of affairs already 
existing in practice:  the EEC and Euratom Councils  had 
been acting pretty well as one ever since 1958, with a single 
Secretariat-General serving both them and the rather more 
separate  ECSC  Council.  The  merger  consisted  merely  in 
unifying the rules of procedure and, in a handful of cases, 
laying down unified  rules  for the passing of a  number of 
decisions henceforth to be taken by the merged Council on 
behalf of all three Communities (as for instance changing 
the number of judges making up the Court of Justice). 
One development of note, however, was the institutiona-
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lization  of the  Committee  of Permanent  Representatives. 
The  Coal  and  Steel  Community  had  had  none,  only  a 
Co-ordinating Committee  (popularly  known  as  "Cocor") 
of civil  servants  from  the  various  capitals  who  did  the 
advance  staff work  for  each  Council  meeting.  Even  that 
was  not specifically  provided for  in  the  Paris  Treaty.  In 
contrast,  the  Permanent  Representatives  and  their  com-
mittee do, of course, play a notable part in connection with 
the operation of  the Common Market and Euratom Treaties 
- though there, too, all that the two treaties actually say on 
the subject is  that the Council's rules of procedure "may" 
provide for the establishment of such a committee. 
The Merger Treaty explicitly institutes a "committee of 
the Permanent Representatives of the member states", with 
specified terms, of reference.  The Committee's powers and 
responsibilities remain unchanged, however, as the terms of 
reference in question are word for word the same as those 
earlier embodied in the Councils' rules of procedure. 
The  Commission  consists  at  present  of  nine  members. 
Throughout their tenure of office the members must act in 
full  independence  both  of the  governments  and  of the 
Council.  The  Council  cannot  remove  any  member  from 
office; only the Parliament can if it wishes, by passing a vote 
of censure, compel the Commission to resign in a body. 
The Commission is  appointed on the basis laid down in 
the Rome Treaties, that is, by agreement among the govern-
ments: the more complicated arrangement under the Paris 
Treaty, whereby one member in two was appointed in this 
way  and the  other co-opted  by  the  sitting  members,  has 
been  scrapped.  Answerability  to  the  Parliament  is  in 
accordance with the Common Market and Euratom rules, 
which assign a greater role to the Parliament than do the 
ECSC rules. 
The Council and Commission are assisted by the Economic 
and  Social  Council  for  Common  Market  and  Euratom 
matters and the Consultative Committee for ECSC matters. 
TheSe  advisory  bodies  consist  of representatives  of the 
various  sections  of economic  and  social  life  (e.g.  trade 
associations, unions, farmers). They have to be consulted in 
advance  of many decisions,  and they  are also  of help  in 
associating the employers and workers with the progress of 
the Community. 
How the Council and Commission work 
In implementation of the Treaty of Paris, the Commission 
can  issue  decisions,  recommendations  and  opinions. 
Decisions are binding in every respect; recommendations are 
binding as to ends but not as  to means; opinions  are not 
binding. 
The Council acts in ECSC affairs mainly at the request of 
the Commission, either stating its views on particular issues 
or giving the endorsement without which, in certain matters, 
the Commission cannot proceed. 
The Commission's ECSC decisions are mostly individual in scope; sometimes, however, they enact general rules, as 
the Commission has power to do this in the same domains 
as are under its jurisdiction for the purposes of individual 
decisions. 
In implementation-of the Rome Treaties, the Council and 
Commission issue regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations and opinions. Regulations are of  general applica-
tion, they are binding in every respect and have direct force 
of law in every member state. Directives are binding on the 
member states to which they are addressed as  regard~ the 
result to be achieved, but leave the mode and means to the 
discretion  of the  national  authorities.  Decisions  may  be 
addressed  either to a  government  or to an enterprise  or 
private individual; they are binding in every respect on the 
party or parties named. Recommendations and opinions are 
not binding. 
This discrepancy in terminology between the Paris Treaty 
and the two Rome Treaties is possibly somewhat confusing. 
An ECSC "recommendation" is a binding enactment corres-
ponding to the EEC and Euratom "directive", whereas an 
EEC "recommendation" is  not binding and ranks in this 
regard as no stronger than an "opinion". 
The operation of the ECSC Treaty is centred principally 
on  the  Commission  (though  the  Council's  role  in  con-
nections of special importance must not be underrated). In 
EEC  and  Euratom,  the  teaming  of the  Commission  and 
Council  in  double  harness  provides  the  driving  force,  and 
perhaps the most original feature,  of the  whole  institutional 
set-up. The Commission's political authority, without which 
the  Commission  could  not properly  fulfil  its  function  in 
relation  to the  Council,  derives  from  the  fact  that it is 
answerable  to the Parliament alone.  Lastly,  the Court of 
Justice, as well as affording the member states and indivi-
duals the assurance of full compliance with the Treaty and 
the  enactments  implementing it,  plays  a  notable  part in 
ensuring  uniform  interpretation.  and  enforcement  of 
Community law. 
Financing the Community 
On the Commission's proposal and following  the political 
guidelines  agreed  upon  at  The  Hague  Conference  of 
Heads  of States  and  Governments  (December  1969),  the 
Council  of Ministers  gave  their  approval  in  1970  for  a 
system  to  be  set  up  granting  the  Community  certain 
financial resources of  its own. Owing to its unusual character, 
the six  Parliaments of the member states had to  approve 
this  decision,  in  accordance  with  the  EEC Treaty,  before 
its entry into force on January 1,  1971. 
This  new  system  is  being introduced gradually between 
1971  and the end of 1977. During a first period (  1971  to the 
end of 1974),  only a  part of Community expenditure will 
be covered by revenue of its own. This revenue will consist 
of levies on imported agricultural products, which since the 
beginning of 1971  without exception have  formed  part of 
the  Community's  own  resources,  and  of an  increasing 
proportion  of customs  duties.  The  remaining  amount  of 
revenue  necessary  for  a  balanced  budget  is  still  met  by 
national contributions calculated on the basis of an overall 
scale  taking  account  of  each  country's  gross  national 
product (GNP). 
From  January  1,  1975,  the  budget  will  be  financed 
entirely  by  Community  resources.  These  will  include  the 
total amount of levies and customs duties, and also revenue 
corresponding to the product of  a fraction of  the value-added 
tax (VAT) up to the equivalent of a one per cent rate of that 
tax.  The value-added tax will  at that time  be  governed by 
Community rules. 
A  certain  framework  has  been  provided  to  enable  this 
system to be introduced gradually.  During the first period 
(1971-74),  each  member state's  relative  share in  financing 
the  budget may  only  fluctuate  from  one  year  to  the  next 
between  +I per cent and -1·5 per cent.  This framework 
will  be  extended for a three-year period once the financing 
is  entirely  ensured  by  Community  resources,  but  at  this 
point the  fluctuation  from  one  year  to  the  next  may  not 
exceed  2  per cent either way.  From January  I,  1978  the 
system will be applied in its entirety without any restrictions. 
Enlargement of the Community 
Enlargement of  the Community through the entry of  four new 
member states will not alter the structure of  the Community's 
institutions and the rules  governing their functioning,  but 
will necessarily change their composition. 
The Commission of the enlarged Community will contain 
14  members  instead  of nine,  representing  the  addition  of 
two  British  members  and  one  member  from  each  of the 
other  three  applicant  countries  (Ireland,  Denmark  and 
Norway). 
Each of the new member countries will  be represented on 
the Council of Ministers. The four large member countries 
(United  Kingdom,  France,  Germany,  Italy)  will  have  ten 
votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands five each, Ireland. 
Denmark and  Norway three each,  and  Luxembourg one. 
This makes a total of 61  votes.  For a proposal to be passed 
by a qualified majority vote 43 votes will  be required in the 
enlarged Community and 19 will form a blocking minority. 
In the Community of Six,  12  out of 17  votes are required 
for a qualified majority. 
The number of judges in  the European Court of Justice 
will be increased to 11, with three advocates general. 
The European Parliament's membership will be increased 
from  142  to  208,  comprising  36  from  each  of the  large 
countries,  14  each from Belgium and the Netherlands, ten 
each  from  Ireland,  Norway  and  Denmark,  and  six  from 
Luxembourg. 
The new  member countries will  adopt the Community's 
financing system by  stages. As far as  the United Kingdom 
is  concerned,  the  proportion of the  Community's annual 
budget to be provided will  rise  from  8·64 per cent in  1973 
to  18·92 per cent in  1977.  In the years  1978  and 1979  the 
British  contribution will  also  be  subject to  limits,  but in 
1980 and after the full  Community system  will  operate in 
the case of the United Kingdom, as it will  have done from 
1978 onwards for the Six. 
3 The Commission 
The European Treaties assign the Commission a wide range 
of duties  which  may  be  roughly grouped as follows.  The 
Commission is the guardian of the Treaties; it is the execu-
tive  arm  of the  Communities;  and  it is  the  initiator  of 
Community policy and exponent of the Community interest 
to the Council. 
Th  Commission as the guardian of the 
Treaties 
The Commission sees to it that the provisions of  the Treaties, 
and the  decisions  of the Institutions,  are properly imple-
mented, and that a climate of mutual confidence prevails. 
If it does this watchdog work well, <all concerne9 can carry 
out their obligations to the full without a qualm, knowing 
that their opposite numbers are doing the  same and that 
any  infringement  of the  Treaties  will  be  duly  penalized. 
Conversely, no one can plead breach of obligation on the 
part of others as  a reason for not doing his  own part: if 
anyone is in breach, it is for the Commission, as an impartial 
authority,  to  investigate,  issue  an  objective  ruling,  and 
notify the Government concerned, subject to verification by 
the Court, of the action required to put matters in order. 
The  ECSC Treaty too,  before  the  others,  required  the 
Institutions to discipline infringements, but the procedure 
involving  governments was  a complex  and cumbrous  one 
which fortunately has seldom had to be invoked. Partly in 
the light of ECSC experience,  the provisions written into 
the Rome Treaties were simpler and stronger, and it is with 
these, of which  a  good  deal of use has  been  made in the 
EEC, that the following account is concerned. 
Where the Commission concludes that the Treaty has been 
infringed - which it may  do  either on the  strength of an 
investigation  by  its  own  officials,  or at the instance  of a 
Government, or following complaints from individuals - it 
requests  the  state in  question  to submit its  comments  or 
counter-arguments  within  a  specified  period  (usually  a 
month or a month and a half). If the member state allows 
the arrangement complained of to  continue and its  com-
ments do not cause the Commission to change its mind, the 
Commission issues a reasoned opinion with which the state 
must comply by the date set; if the state fails to do so, the 
Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice, 
whose  judgment  is  binding  on  both  the  state  and  the 
Institutions. 
These provisions, which give  the Institutions a consider-
able  measure  of authority,  are  in  fact  enforced  in  all 
respects.  Thus, for  example,  during  1970  the  Commission 
instituted  proceedings  for  infringement  in  50  cases,  and 
decided to refer to the Court two cases. 
Most of the arrangements proceeded against in the first 
few  years  for infringement of the EEC Treaty related  to 
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customs duties and quotas. Nowadays there are cases under 
a great many other Treaty provisions - notably the applica-
tion  of the  agricultural  regulations  - and  the  variety  is 
likely to grow as time goes on and more common policies 
come into effect.  There is little prospect, therefore, of any 
diminution in the Commission's "police" activities. 
The  economic  impact  of the  actionable  arrangements 
themselves was inconsiderable: for the most part they were 
not deliberate attempts to evade the Treaty, but the result 
either  of differences  in  interpretation  between  the  Com-
mission and one of the member states, which were settled 
by the Court, or of the kind of mistake that is pretty well . 
bound to crop up here and there when national civil services 
have to adjust to Community procedures. It  can reasonably 
be considered that the infringements committed up to now 
have  not  interfered  to  any  real  extent  with  the  proper 
implementation of the Treaties. 
The Commission as the executive arm of the 
Communities 
The Commission is  directly invested  by the Treaties with 
wide  executive powers; in addition, it now possesses  sub-
stantial extra powers conferred on it by the Council, mostly 
in connection with EEC matters, for securing the implemen-
tation of enactments based on the Treaty (this is termed 
"derived Community law"). 
Both  sets  of powers,  those  stemming  direct  from th. 
Treaties and those made over by the Council, can be sub-
divided under two or three main heads. 
1.  Preparation of the implementing orders with 
respect  to  certain  Treaty  provisions  or  Council 
enactments. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  gives  the  Commission  particularly 
extensive rule-making powers: its function is declared to be 
"to assure  the achievement  of the  purposes stated in this 
Treaty  within  the  terms  thereof",  and  practically  every 
article invests it with a fresh responsibility and correspond-
ing powers. 
The  Rome  Treaties  also  give  the  Commission  direct 
rule-making  authority,  especially  the  EEC  Treaty  with 
regard to  all  matters connected  with  the establishment of 
the customs union in accordance with the Treaty timetable. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  mainly  the  powers  conferred  by  the 
Council  in  connection  with  the  common  policies  - and 
more especially common agricultural policy - that have so 
notably enlarged  the  Commission's  responsibilities  in  the 
last  few  years.  Figures  speak  louder  than words:  during 
1970  alone,  the  Commission  enacted  2,448  regulations, 
mostly relating to the common agricultural policy. 
2.  Application of the Treaties· rules to particular 
cases (whether concerning a governm  nt or a firm) 
and the administration of Community funds. 
Here again the Commission plays a particularly prominen 
role in the ECSC: it deals direct with the coal and steel enter-
prises, closely superintends certain aspects of  their activities, 
and can promote and  co-ordinate  their  capital spending, 
assist  miners  and  steelworkers  facing  redundancy,  grant loans and so on. 
Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  it  has  many  similar  powers, 
especially  with  regard  to competition  (keeping  cartelliza-
tion and market dominance within bounds, similarly setting 
limits  to,  or  doing  away  with,  state  subsidization,  dis-
couraging discriminatory fiscal  practices, etc.); in addition, 
it has been given various powers by the Council with respect 
to the common policies, notably on agriculture and transport. 
Under  the  Euratom  Treaty  it  has  supervisory  respon-
sibilities comparable with those it bears in the coal and steel 
sector,  concerning  such l matters  as  supplies  of  fissile 
materials, protection against radiation, inspection of  nuclear 
plant, and dissemination of technical information. 
Again, the Commission is the Institution responsible for 
the administration of Community funds. The lead was given 
by the ECSC. A levy paid in direct to the Commission on coal 
and steel production assures it of  sizeable financial resources, 
part of which is expended on the tiding-over, retraining and 
redeployment of redundant workers, and another part held 
in  reserve  as  backing for  the  borrowings from  which the 
Commission relends  towards the modernization of mines 
and steel plants and the redevelopment of areas affected by 
declining  coal  or steel  production.  Between  1952  and the 
end  of 1970,  the  High  Authority  and  its  successor,  the 
Commission, in this way  borrowed and relent in all  some 
$1,033 million. 
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On the Euratom side, the Commission is  in charge of a 
Community  research  and  training  programme.  The  first 
five-year  programme  (1958-62)  represented  an  outlay  of 
$215 million, the second (1963-67) an outlay of$430 million. 
The many projects carried out include the construction of 
four nuclear research stations: at Ispra in Italy, Karlsruhe 
in Germany, Mol in Belgium and Petten in the Netherlands, 
with a total staff of over 2,000. 
As a result of the major changes which have taken place 
in nuclear research in the last few  years,  Euratom's joint 
research centre is being reorganized and its aims redefined. 
These  are  substantial sums,  but they  are no  means  all. 
First  of all,  the  European  Social  Fund,  which  helps  to 
retrain  and  redeploy  workers,  has  been  given  a  more 
decisive  role  in  the  development  of social  structures.  At 
present  it is  allocated  some  $60  million  a  year  and  this 
budget (to be financed by the Community's direct revenue) 
is likely to increase considerably. 
Then there is  the European Development Fund for  the 
overseas  countries  and  territories  associated  with  the 
Community:  the  first  Development  Fund  (1958-63) 
disbursed $580 million, while the second (1964-69)  had an 
appropriation of $730  million,  of which  $680  million  was 
set  aside  for  grants  and  $50  million  for  exceptionally 
advantageous loans.  The third EDF (1971-75)  provides  a 
~total of $900 million, including $810 million in grants and 
~90  million in loans. 
The  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund  disposes  of much  larger  amounts  still.  Under  the 
1971  budget,  for  instance,  it received  $3,652  million,  to 
enable it to cover the agricultural market support costs and 
to furnish assistance of $758 million towards farm moderni-
zation schemes. 
3.  Administration of the safeguard clauses in the 
Treaties. 
These, the so-called "escape clauses", provide that authoriza-
tion may  be given  to waive  the Treaties' requirements in 
exceptional circumstances. This places a very heavy respon-
sibility on the Commission. Had it been left to the individual 
states  themselves  to  decide  whether  special  problems  or 
circumstances entitled them to by-pass the rules laid down 
in the Treaty or the implementing orders,  sooner or later 
interpretations would have  differed,  and before long each 
would have been doing as it pleased.  The Treaties wisely 
provide that the Commission and the Commission only, in 
the  strictest  independence  and objectivity,  may  authorize 
waivers ("derogations") at the request of a member state, 
having considered all the circumstances and seeking in each 
case to ensure that the operation of the Common Market is 
interfered with as little as possible. The Council has given it 
similar powers in the enactments relating to the common 
policies. 
Waivers may be of  many kinds, ranging from the fixing of 
tariff  quotas  to  the  exemption  of whole  sectors  of the 
economy from the Treaty's requirements. Most of the cases 
in which the escape clauses  have been  invoked have con-
cerned the ECSC and the EEC. However, High Authority 
and Commission action has enabled the waivers to be kept 
strictly limited in scope, so  that they have only marginally 
impaired the operation of the Common Market. 
The main safeguard clauses  which  were  inserted in  the 
Treaties themselves had a general scope, but were valid only 
during the transitional period, i.e. until December 31,  1969. 
The  only  exception  is  Article  115  of the  EEC  Treaty, 
which  authorizes  member states to take measures  against 
deflection of trade. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Community  rules  which  have 
developed in many sectors have,  in  certain cases  and in a 
more restrictive manner, provided for exceptional measures. 
These are generally more concerned with relations between 
the  Community  and  non-member  countries  than  with 
relations  between  the  member  states  themselves.  The 
Commission has been entrusted with the responsibility for 
these  measures,  and  in  most  cases  the  Council  may  be 
asked  to  modify  or  confirm  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Commission.  Recourse  to  these  exceptional  measures  has 
become  less  and  less  frequent  and  the  Commission  has 
always insisted on granting waivers only to the extent that 
they are necessary and implemented in such a way that they 
do not substantially affect the functioning of the Common 
Market. 
The Management Committees 
We have seen  how much Council decisions have done, as 
regards the EEC, to extend the field  of the Commission's 
management and administration work by giving the latter 
additional  responsibilities  in  the  enforcement  of derived 
Community law.  In many cases,  the Council was anxious 
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consultation with the member governments, and accordingly 
various  committees  of  government  representatives.  are 
attached to the Commission. Some are purely consultative 
in  character,  but the  most  original,  and in the event the 
most valuable, part of the system is the array of "Manage-
ment Committees" concerned with agricultural marketing, 
one committee for each main category of products. 
The  procedure  is  that  the  implementing  measure  the 
Commission intends to enact is submitted in draft form to 
the appropriate Management Committee, which then gives 
its opinion, arrived at by voting weighted in the same way 
as in the Council. 
The  committee's  opinion  is  not  binding  on  the  Com-
mission, which notes the contents but remains entirely free 
to decide for itself; the measure once enacted by it there-
upon has direct force  of law.  However, if the opinion has 
been given by qualified majority (12 votes out of 17) and the 
Commission nevertheless takes a different stand, the matter 
goes  before  the  Council,  which  may  within  one  month 
reverse the Commission's decision. If on the other hand the 
Commission's  decision  is  in  line  with  the  committee's 
opinion, or if no opinion has been forthcoming (the com-
mittee having failed to muster a qualified majority one way 
or the other), that decision is final and no appeal can lie to 
the Council. 
The  Management  Committee  procedure  is  extensively 
employed,  and  works  extremely  well.  In  1970,  some  300 
meetings of  the various Management Committees were held, 
following  which  about  1000  Commission  regulations and 
decisions were adopted. 
This is  eloquent of the atmosphere of co-operation and 
mutual confidence which has developed in the committees 
between  the  Commission's  departments  and  the  national 
departments which subsequently enforce the Commission's 
enactments. 
The function of the Management Committees is to act as 
a kind of alarm mechanism. When the Commission differs 
from  an opinion  given  by  a  qualified  majority  - that is, 
voted for by most of the Government representatives - this 
is a clear indication of a difficult situation or a serious prob-
lem,  which  it is  only  right  and  proper that the  Council 
should deliberate itself. That it is seldom called upon to do 
so is proof that the system works and the parties to it are 
substantially in agreement. 
The  Management  Committees  having  been  such  a 
success,  similar arrangements have  been introduced in  the 
last few  years in  other fields  also.  Thus,  three committees 
of government  representatives  have  been  set  up  to  help 
manage  different  aspects  of  the  implementation  of  the 
common customs tariff following  the establishment of the 
customs union on July  1,  1968.  Others have been set up, in 
particular  to  control  technical  and  health  standards, 
especially  in  the  food  and  animal-health  fields.  Basically, 
the system is  the same as for the agricultural Management 
Committees,  though  the  conditions  under  which  the 
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Council may be called upon to act will be different, according 
to the particular features of each case. 
A  formula  which  has  already  been  applied  in  several 
cases  provides  that when  the  provisions  envisaged  by  the 
Commission conflict with the committee's opinion, or when 
there is  no  opinion, the Commission may make a proposal 
to  the Council on the  measures to be  taken.  The Council 
decides by a qualified majority vote.  If the Council reaches 
no  decision  within a certain time (normally three months) 
after  the  matter  has  been  referred  to  it,  the  Commission 
takes the decision itself. 
The Commission and the coherenc  of 
Community policy 
The Commission is  the initiator of Community policy and 
exponent of the Community interest, and is responsible for 
seeing  that  Community  policy  forms  a  single  consistent 
whole. 
In the  more  limited  fields  of ECSC and  Euratom,  the 
High  Authority  and the  Euratom Commission had more 
to do in the way of administration and supervision and less 
in the way of framing common policies, it being peculiarly 
difficult  to  hammer  out such  policies  for  Communities 
having jurisdiction only  over specific  sectors.  The merged 
Commission made it one of its first concerns, now that the 
relevant powers and responsibilities had been concentrated 
in its hands, to reactivate a number of common policies -
industrial policy, energy policy, research and technological 
policy - which despite valuable achievements in the early 
stages had been hanging fire  in consequence of the fact of 
there being three separate Executives. 
The initiating of common policies will thus be the single 
Commission's most important function, just as, and indeed 
still  more than,  it was  the  EEC Commission's.  This it is 
doing in the closest cooperation with the Council, so  that 
any account of this facet of its work is at the same time in 
effect  an  account  of the  function  and  operation  of the 
Council also. 
Why  did  the  EEC  Commission  devote  itself from  the 
outset primarily to the framing of common policies? Quite 
apart from the dictates of economics, because the Common 
Market Treaty is what may be termed an "outline treaty", 
unlike  its  ECSC  and  Euratom  counterparts,  which  are 
"code-of-rules  treaties".  For,  whereas  the  latter  two  lay 
down in careful detail exactly what rules are to be applied 
and what tasks  performed in  their respective  spheres, the 
Common Market Treaty, apart from its "automatic" pro-
visions  on the dismantling of tariffs  and quotas,  confines 
itself to sketching out in general terms the policy lines to be 
pursued in the main areas of economic activity, leaving it 
to  the  Community  Institutions,  and  more  especially  the 
Council and Commission in conjunction with the Parliament, 
to work out the actual arrangements the Community is to 
establish. 
In a sense, everything to do with the economic union has 
been left blank in the Treaty, but the blanks can be filled in 
by the Institutions without need for fresh treaties or fresh parliamentary ratification. The measures the Institutions are 
empowered  to  bring  in  are  full-scale  "European  laws", 
directly enforceable in all the member states and capable of 
producing radical changes in the sectors concerned. To give 
an example, the great corpus of "European laws" on agri-
culture, promulgated from  1962 onwards, is comparable in 
scope to the corpus of rules contained in the ECSC Treaty. 
It is  worth pausing a moment to consider the view  fre-
quently  voiced  that  the  Common  Market  Treaty  is  less 
supranational, or more intergovernmental, than the ECSC 
Treaty. This is to a great extent a mistaken approach. The 
"code-of-rules" Coal and Steel Treaty laid down the High 
Authority's  powers  of implementation  in detail,  but not 
until the requisite common policies have been agreed can it 
be known what powers of implementation the Commission 
holds in each particular sector covered by the EEC Treaty. 
Experience with regard to cartels and agriculture has shown 
us that these powers are similar to those stemming from the 
ECSC Treaty. It should be added, however, that the Paris 
Treaty did, right from the start, assure the High Authority, 
and now assures the Commission, of  an independent income 
from the ECSC levy, with the aid of which the Executive has 
been able to do a good deal on the financial and social side, 
whereas  the  corresponding  provision  in  the  EEC  Treaty 
entered into effect on January 1,  1971  (under the system of 
independent revenue described on page 3). 
Actually, the Paris and Rome Treaties are based on the 
same principles and purport to set up parallel institutional 
systems. But the EEC Treaty, evolving as it goes along and 
allowing its makers to work out empirically when the time 
comes the arrangement best suited to a particular sector or 
situation, has jarred the less on those not fully converted to 
the Community idea, while the balance which it represents 
between the powers of the national Governments and the 
powers of  the European Institutions is more clearly apparent 
to those who are just beginning to know and to learn to live 
with  the  Communities.  For all  the  difficulties  the  EEC 
has encountered, this is none the less a fact. 
The Commission-
Council dialogue 
The merged Institutions have taken over from their predeces-
sors  the  work  of building  up  the  fabric  of European 
economic union: the Treaties laid the foundations, but the 
structure  had  still  to  be  erected.  In  addition,  once  the 
fabric  is  in  place  for  a  particular  sector,  they  have  to 
formulate and implement day by day the Community policy 
that is to take the place of the six national policies. 
Under the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  dialogue  between  Com-
mission and Council existed,  but on a  limited scale  only. 
The Commission (or the High Authority, as it then was) 
bore a great deal of the responsibility for the implementa-
tion of the Treaty, but the Council's endorsement-in some 
cases its unanimous endorsement - was required neverthe-
less  for  certain  particularly  important  decisions,  as  for 
instance in the event of "manifest crisis" or if it was desired 
to amend the Treaty. The form is of course not the same as 
in the  Rome Treaties.  In the ECSC,  the  High Authority 
(now the Commission) decides with the Council's endorse-
ment; in the EEC and Euratom, the Council decides on the 
basis of the Commission's proposal. The difference is  not 
without its implications from the policymaking standpoint, 
but in both cases the two Institutions have their part to play 
before a decision can be finally adopted. 
Under  the  Rome  Treaties,  any  measure  of  general 
application or of a  certain level  of importance  has to be 
enacted by the Council of Ministers, but except in a very few 
cases the Council can only proceed upon proposal by the 
Commission. The Commission has thus a permanent duty 
to initiate action. If it submits no proposals, the Council is 
paralysed and the forward march of the Community comes 
to a halt-in agriculture, in transport, in commercial policy, 
in harmonization of laws,  or whatever the field  concerned 
may be. 
As an indication of the volume of the Commission's and 
Council's  work  under  the  three  Treaties,  it  may  be 
mentioned  that  in  1970  the  Commission  laid  before  the 
Council  390  proposals  and  376  memoranda  and  other 
documents of various kinds. 
During  1970  the  Council,  in  addition  to  dealing  with 
purely  procedural  matters  and  with  budgets  and financial 
regulations,  adopted  249  regulations,  25  directives,  71 
decisions and the important second medium-term economic 
programme. 
As is apparent, the Rome Treaty procedure is  of far the 
commoner occurrence in the dealings between the merged 
Commission  and  the  merged  Council.  A  few  further 
particulars as to its operation may therefore be in order. 
A proposal having been lodged, a dialogue begins between 
the Ministers of  the Council, putting their national points of 
view, and the Commission, in its capacity as the European 
body upholding the interest of the Community as a whole 
and seeking European solutions to common problems. 
There might seem to be some risk of the dialogue being 
distorted  by the Commission's  being  less  strongly  placed 
than the  governments  with  the  weight  of their  sovereign 
authority behind them.  However,  the Rome Treaties con-
trive rather ingeniously to ensure that the two  are evenly 
matched. 
In the Commission's favour there is, for a start, the fact 
that it draws up the proposal the Council is to deliberate -
and only  on the  basis  of that proposal can  the  Council 
deliberate at all. But its position is buttressed in other ways 
too. 
Article  149  EEC (119  Euratom),  one  of the  key  com-
ponents in the institutional structure, provides that "when, 
pursuant to this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal of 
the  Commission,  it shall,  where  the  amendment  of such 
proposal is  involved,  act  only  by  means  of a  unanimous 
vote". 
If the Ministers are unanimous, they can therefore decide 
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to the Commission's proposal. This is fair enough, since the 
Council is then expressing the united view of all the govern-
ments together. 
On the other hand, they can decide by a majority only if 
their decision is in line with the Commission's proposal. In 
other words,  if the  member  states  are  not at one,  they 
cannot take a majority decision unless it entails accepting 
the proposal in  toto,  without amendment: only the Com-
mission  itself  can  amend  it.  Thus,  in  cases  where  the 
majority rule applies, the position is that either the Council 
adopts the Commission's proposal as it stands, by a majority, 
or it decides against the proposal, unanimously, or it fails 
to come to a  decision at all.  So  the Commission does in 
fact have genuine bargaining power in the Council. Dialogue 
can  be conducted,  and is  indeed conducted  on the  Com-
mission's own ground. 
Now  this  dialogue  has  a  momentum  of its  own.  The 
application of the majority rule,  as fairly  substantial EEC 
experience has shown, does not mean that a state is liable 
to find itself outvoted at the drop of a hat. The Commission 
in drawing up its proposal will have been careful to take into 
account the often widely-varying interests of the individual 
states and seek to establish where the general interest lies. 
As is usual in a club of so few members, both the members 
of the Council and the Commission like to be in agreement 
if they can. Hence, if faced with the prospect of being out-
voted, a minister may feel it best to abandon an extreme or 
isolated position, while for the sake of good relations the 
Commission, and those of the Council who are in favour of 
its proposal, may make the necessary efforts to help secure 
a rapprochement. The result-a trifle paradoxical, but amply 
confirmed in practice - is  that the majority rule makes for 
much easier and quicker arrival at unanimity. In this delicate 
interplay of forces, the Commission is always in a position 
to sway the outcome. 
The Commission is thus centrally placed in the Council, 
able regularly to act as "honest broker" among the Govern-
ments, and to apply the prompting and pressure required to 
evolve formulas acceptable all round. 
The implications for  policymaking are  more important 
still. The Commission's proposals embody a policy prepared 
by it on the basis purely of the interest of the Community 
as a whole. The fact that the Commission is there to stay 
throughout its term of office ensures the continuity of that 
policy, and the Council can pronounce only on the Com-
mission's proposed enactments for putting the policy into 
effect. There is therefore no danger that the Council might 
adopt conflicting  proposals  on  different  issues  in  conse-
quence  of shifting  majorities  arising  out  of alliances  of 
interests or contests of influence among Governments. 
Nor can it happen that a  majority of the Council, un-
backed by the Commission, can impose  on a  recalcitrant 
state a measure gravely deleterious to that state's essential 
interests. If  the Commission does its job properly, it can be 
no  party  to  such  a  proceeding.  Its  role  thus  affords  an 
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important safeguard, more especially to the smaller member 
states, and they in particular have always set great store by 
this. 
Unanimity and majority voting 
Under  the  Paris  Treaty,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Council's 
endorsement is required only in a limited number of cases; 
in some it has to be unanimous, but in most it can be given 
by a majority vote. This system has been duly adhered to 
since  the  Treaty came  into  force.  When  the  Council,  in 
May 1959, refused its consent to the High Authority's plan 
to declare  a  state  of ~'manifest crisis"  in the coal  sector 
(ECSC was then going through one of  its periods of greatest 
difficulty), the case was, it should be noted, one calling for a 
majority and not a unanimous endorsement: the Council's 
refusal was  due therefore not to a solitary veto but to the 
fact that there was not a majority in favour. 
In the EEC, during the first two stages of  the transitional 
period, from 1958 to the end of 1965, most Council decisions 
had to be unanimous, so that the procedure described above 
was  not often  needed.  Nevertheless,  thanks to the  Com-
munity spirit of the members  of the Council,  and to the 
collective  authority  of  the  Commission  and  the  high 
personal  repute .of  its  members,  the  dialogue  invariably 
went off smoothly and the Commission was able to play its 
part of instigator and conciliator to the full. 
The scheduled move into the third stage, on January 1, 
1966, was to have brought a major extension in the scope 
for majority decisions, but at this point the majority principle 
became the focus of a Community crisis. Was it tolerable, 
one of the governments  demanded,  that a  member  state 
should be overruled by the rest where one of its essential 
interests was at stake? 
This is  not a  question that can be  answered merely  by 
citing the relevant provisions,  nor indeed is it possible to 
define  objectively what constitutes an "essential interest". 
Besides,  if for the sake of argument the matter is  viewed 
purely in terms of interests, it could well  be that in fields 
where all the member states had forgone their freedom of 
action for the benefit of the Community, the vetoing of a 
Community  decision  for  the  sake  of a  national  interest 
would  prejudice  the  essential  interests  of other  member 
states,  which  would  be  harmed  by  the  paralysis  of the 
Community. On the other hand, a state accepting the Com-
munity system and relying on its inner logic, its Institutions 
and their rules and traditions can be assured that these will 
furnish all reasonable safeguards. 
The general interest of the Community must of necessity 
take account of any essential interest of one of its members. 
It is the Institutions' bounden duty, therefore, to consider 
such  an interest  to  the  full.  The  close  union  of the  six 
nations which the Community exists to bring about would 
in any case not be feasible if one of those nations suffered 
grave injury to its essential interests. Moreover, the system 
of deliberation in the Council just described is calculated to 
achieve the broadest possible measure of agreement. Con-versely,  even where unanimity is  the rule, no member of a 
Community can disregard the general interest in assessing 
his  own:  unanimity  in  a  Community  cannot  be  equated 
with an absolute right of veto. 
Thus, in a living Community, abuse of majority voting -
and probably abuse of unanimity too - is a theoretical risk 
which,  with  the  Community's  inner  bonds  drawing  ever 
closer as it moves forward, is  becoming less and less likely 
to  materialize,  while  the possibility  of majority  decisions 
renders the whole system more flexible  and more dynamic. 
To have faith in the future, faith in the Institutions' and 
governments' good sense  and desire to work amicably to-
gether, is the only possible answer. After all, the six Foreign 
Ministers in session in Luxembourg on January 28,  1966, 
after months of crisis and difficult debate, had in the end to 
acknowledge that failure to agree on the application of the 
majority  rule  was  no  reason  for  not continuing with  the 
joint venture. 
The European 
Parliament 
For  the dialogue between Commission and Council to be a 
genuine. one, it is necessary that the Commission should be 
genuinely  independent.  To  this  end,  the  Treaties  make it 
answerable to the European Parliament alone. 
The Parliament is  so  constituted  as  to  be  in  fact  truly 
Community  in  character,  fully  integrated.  There  are  no 
national  sections;  there  are  only  European-level  political 
groups. The Parliament keeps constant watch on the Com-
mission's doings,  making sure that it faithfully  represents 
the Community interest, ready at any time to call it to order 
if it gives the impression of yielding to blandishments from 
the  governments  or  from  a  particular  government.  In 
addition, the Parliament has to be  expressly consulted on 
the  Commission's  more  important  proposals  under  the 
Rome Treaties before these go to the Council. 
The Parliament's various committees play a notable part 
in  this  connection.  The  House  itself  normally  meets  in 
ordinary session only six times a year, for a week at a time 
(plus, on occasion, a number of extraordinary sessions of a 
day or two).  Between  sessions,  each of the parliamentary 
committees meets at least once, and usually more, and the 
appropriate member of the Commission appears before it 
to give an account of  the decisions taken by the Commission, 
the  decisions  referred  to  the  Council,  and  the  position 
adopted by the Commission vis-a-vis the Council. 
The committees thus follow developments in detail, and 
as they meet in camera they can be told a great deal, includ-
ing even confidential matter. Their work has done much to 
increase  the  Parliament's  influence  in  the  day-to-day 
handling of affairs. 
The written questions which Members of Parliament can 
put  to  the  Commission  (and  also  to  the  Council)  offer 
another means of  control which is being increasingly resorted 
to.  During  the  parliamentary  year  1970-71,  526  written 
questions  were  put  to  the  Commission  and  57  to  the 
Council,  while  one  question  was  put  jointly  to  both 
institutions. 
By means of oral questions put in plenary session of the 
House (which  may  or may not be followed  by  a  debate). 
the Parliament is enabled to keep a careful eye on develop-
ments in European policy, both generally and with respect 
to particular sectors,  and to  comment direct  at the  time, 
sidestepping  the  sometimes  rather unwieldy  procedure  of 
statements by  the Commission, sending to committee, and 
reports to the full  House.  The Parliament has in the last 
few  years  been  making  more  and more  use  of this  very 
flexible  and effective device, putting oral questions both to 
the Commission and to the Council (though it does some-
times happen that the Council is  not able to reply by the 
time indicated). 
In the  parliamentary year  1970-71  a  total  of nine  oral 
questions,  with  or  without  ensuing  debate,  were  put  to 
the Commission, and eight to the Council. 
With the  Community's responsibilities  growing as  they 
are  doing,  it  is  becoming  absolutely  essential  that  steps 
should be  taken in the near future to give  the Parliament 
wider  powers  and  to  make  it  more  representative,  for 
example  by  causing  it  to  be  elected  by  direct  universal 
suffrage. This is bound to come, despite the hesitations that 
have prevented it up to now. 
The control exercised by the Parliament thus underpins 
the independence of the Commission, thanks to which the 
Co"4ncil  has  the  advantages  of  the  majority  principle 
and  is  shielded  as  far  as  may  be  from  such  risks  as  it 
entails. 
Increased powers 
At  the  same  time  as  the  Council  decided  to  grant  the 
Community a system of financial resources of its own, the 
member states signed a Protocol on April 22,  1970, to alter 
the Community Treaties in order to increase the Parliament's 
budgetary powers.  This  increase  of powers  applies  to  the 
"free"  part of the  budget,  i.e.,  basically,  the  part which 
deals with the functioning of the Community's institutions. 
In  1971  the  Parliament  received  considerably  increased 
powers  over  this  "free"  part,  although  the  Council  may 
still  amend  its  proposals.  On  the  other hand,  from  1975 
onwards  the  Parliament will  have  the  last  word  and  will 
take the final decisions on this part of the budget. 
The sums  in  question  may  seem  limited  in  comparison 
with the total amount of the budget (they are often reckoned 
to amount to about 5 per cent),  but the power to control 
them  assumes  great  political  importance,  because  they 
determine the means whereby the Community's institutions 
may  work and carry out inquiries  and studies,  i.e.  every-
thing which guarantees their independent functioning.  Not 
only will the Parliament be able to alter the contents of the 
budget,  it  will  also  be  able  to  increase  it  within  certain 
limits. 
The appropriations in the other part of the budget, which 
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the  virtually  automatic  consequence  of Community  rules 
(e.g.  rules  about  agricultural  markets).  The  Parliament 
has not been  given the last word in  this field.  It may only 
propose amendments to the Council, which has undertaken 
to give  its  reasons to the Parliament if it does  not accept 
such amendments. 
The  agreement  giving  these  increased  powers  to  the 
Parliament came into force on January 1,  1971, after being 
ratified by the six Parliaments. The Parliament exercised its 
new  powers  for  the  first  time  when  it  adopted  a  revised 
version of the 1971  budget in  order to take account of the 
introduction  of the  system  of Community  resources.  The 
Commission has undertaken to make proposals before the 
end  of 1972,  on  the  basis  of the  experience  obtained  in 
applying the new procedures, for amending the Treaties to 
increase the powers of the Parliament. 
The  increase  in  Community  activities  after The  Hague 
summit conference and the decisions  on the  Community's 
own  financial  resources,  together  with  the increase in  the 
powers  of the Parliament,  have  made it possible to make 
new  efforts to enlist the support of public opinion and of 
the Community's institutions for  the direct election of the 
European  Parliament.  In  addition  to  many  moves  made 
by  political  organizations  or  parties  (in  particular,  bills 
have  been  tabled  in  several  national  Parliaments  for  the 
delegates from these countries to the European Parliament 
to  be  elected  by  direct  universal  suffrage  without waiting 
for  a  general  election  for  the  European  Parliament),  the 
European  Parliament  has,  by  its  insistence,  induced  the 
Council to renew its work on the draft convention for the 
direct  election  of the  Parliament  which  was  referred  to 
the  Council  in  1960.  Such  pressure  by  the  Parliament 
can be  expected to increase further in the months to come. 
An  increase  in  the  powers  of the  Parliament  and  a 
strengthening  of  its  representative  character,  by,  for 
example,  its  election  by  direct  universal  suffrage,  will  be 
absolutely essential in  the near future,  by  the very  fact  of 
the extension  of the  Community's responsibilities.  Such a 
development is  inevitable, whatever the reservations which 
have been able to prevent it up till now. 
Parliamentary control would ensure the independence of 
the Commission, and enable the Council to benefit from the 
advantages of majority voting, while being preserved as far 
as possible from its various risks. 
The Court of Justice 
By  reason of the substantial powers of direct enforcement 
vested  in  the  High  Authority  for  the  operation  of the 
common  market for  coal  and steel,  the  ECSC  Court of 
Justice was mainly called upon to handle appeals to it by 
coal  and  steel  enterprises.  In  1958,  the  Rome  Treaties 
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instituted in its stead a single Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities:  since  they,  and particularly the EEC 
Treaty,  required  for  their implementation  a  considerable 
measure of government action, the first cases coming before 
the  new  Court were  brought by the  Commission  against 
the  governments  for  infringements  of the  Treaties.  Later 
there came also appeals by governments  against decisions 
of the Commission, and appeals by individuals. 
The Court's procedure for dealing with cases of this kind 
is broadly similar to that of the highest courts of appeal of 
the member states. Its judgments not only settle the particu-
lar matters  at issue,  but also  lay  down  the  precise  con-
struction to be placed on disputed passages in the Treaties, 
thereby  affording  clarification  and  guidance  as  to  their 
implementation. 
In recent years, over and above this function of making 
sure that Community enactments are good law,  the Court 
has  increasingly  been  called  upon to  sit  on interlocutory 
appeals  from  national  courts.  Community law  proper as 
contained  in  the  Treaties,  and  the  corpus  of enactments 
based  on  the  Treaties  (derived  Community  law),  are 
becoming  more  and more  interwoven  with  the  municipal 
law of the individual member countries, and consequently 
their  implementation  is  occupying  a  growing  part of the 
national courts' attention. By the end of 1970, the national 
courts had handed down over  331  decisions  having to do 
with  Community law under the EEC and ECSC Treaties. 
(So  far  there  have  been  none  concerning  the  Euratom 
Treaty, owing to its rather special character). 
Interlocutory referrals to the Court of Justice are requests 
to  it to  rule  as  to  the  interpretation  or applicability  of 
particular portions  of Community law  (in the ECSC, the 
applicability of Commission and Council enactments only). 
Their steadily-growing numbers bears witness to the closer 
interaction in matters of litigation between the  European 
Court and the national courts, which is enabling Community 
law to be  uniformly enforced in all the member countries 
and a consistent body of European case law built up. 
A  few  figures  may  serve  to  indicate  the  extent  of the 
Court of Justice's  work.  Between  1952,  when  the  ECSC 
Treaty came into force,  and the end of 1970,  489  actions 
were  lodged,  not  counting  administrative  actions  by 
Community  officials  in  connection  with  staff  rules  and 
regulations.  Of this total, 209  related to the  EEC Treaty: 
of  these  just  under  half  were  pre-judicial  rulings,  one 
quarter  were  actions  by  individuals,  and  the  remainder 
actions by the Commission or by governments. Of the 278 
ECSC  cases  brought  between  1952  and  1970,  256  were 
instituted by individuals and enterprises, 21  by governments, 
and one by  the former  High Authority.  Two  actions had 
been brought with respect to Euratom. Working methods 
From this brief account of  the main duties of  the Institutions, 
their  relation  to  one  another  and the  balance  of powers 
among them, we now turn to their methods. 
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Departments of the Commission 
The  merged  Commission's  departments  consist  of  the 
combined  departments  of the  High  Authority  of ECSC 
and of the EEC and  Euratom Commissions.  There are a 
Secretariat-General,  a  Legal  Department,  a  Statistical 
Office,  18  Directorates-General,  and  a  small  number  of 
specialized  services.  Most  of the  scientific  activities  are 
grouped  in  a  Joint  Research  Centre.  The  staff numbers 
some  5,000,  including  1,400  in  the Administrative grades 
and  450  translators  and  interpreters.  They  are  divided 
between  the  two  provisional  seats  of  the  Community, 
Brussels  and  Luxembourg,  about  1,000  officials  working 
in  the  latter.  In  addition  there  is  the  Euratom  research 
budget's  establishment  of approximately  2,400,  most  of 
them  in  the  various  units  of Euratom's  Joint  Research 
Centre. 
The operating expenses of the departments of the Com-
mission  and  the  other  three  Institutions  are  at  present 
running at about $120 million a year. 
Each of the nine Members of the Commission has been 
made  specially  responsible for  one  or more of the Com-
munity's  main  fields  of activity  (external  relations,  agri-
culture,  social  affairs  and so  on),  and has  under him the 
Directorate or Directorates-General dealing with these. 
Operation of the Commission 
By the terms of the Treaties, the Commission's operation is 
"collegiate": that is, the Commission must itself, as a body, 
adopt the  various  measures  - viz.  regulations,  decisions, 
proposals to the Council, etc. - incumbent on it under the 
Treaties  or implementing  orders,  and  cannot,  therefore, 
delegate to a member in his particular sphere powers giving 
him a degree of independence comparable to that of,  say, 
a minister in his department. Only very limited delegations 
of powers are granted, for the issuance of strictly technical 
implementing  measures  in  line  with  the  Commission's 
agreed approach, such as  the day-to-day fixing  of certain 
agricultural levies. 
Various procedural devices have been adopted to ensure 
that the  system  does  not allow  log-jams  to  build  up  in 
Commission  business.  A  number  of working  parties  of 
members  of the  Commission have  been  set  up to do the 
groundwork for  the Commission's proceedings in matters 
where  the  responsibilities  of two  or more  members  and 
departments interlock, as for instance the industrial affairs 
group and the external relations and development aid group. 
The  more  technical  items  on the  Commission's  agenda 
are  considered  at  a  weekly  meeting  of  the  members' 
immediate subordinates, the Chief Executive Assistants, in 
order  to  simplify  and  speed  up  the  proceedings.  Fairly 
straightforward matters are to a great extent dealt with by 
means of "written procedure" earlier employed by the EEC 
Commission: the members are sent the particulars and the 
text of a  proposed decision,  and if within  a  given  period 
(usually  one  week)  they  have  not entered  reservations  or 
objections the proposal is taken as adopted. 
In  1969  the  written  procedure  was  undertaken  3,412 
times and 3,579 times in 1970. 
Only issues of some importance, therefore, actually figure 
on the agenda of the Commission itself, which meets each 
week for at least one whole day. 
When discussing particularly delicate matters, the mem-
bers of the Commission sit alone, with no officials present 
except the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General. 
In other cases,  the  officials  responsible  may  be  called in. 
Although its decisions .can be taken by a majority, many are 
in  fact  unanimous.  Where  a  vote  is  taken,  the  minority 
always  abides  by  the  majority decision,  which  thereupon 
constitutes the stance of the whole Commission. 
How the Commission draws up its decisions and 
proposals 
The  Commission  proceeds  in  two  quite  different  ways, 
according as it is concerned to establish the broad outlines 
of the policy it intends to pursue in a particular field,  or to 
fi~ the practical details of that policy as  well  as of various 
measures of a more technical nature, not so much connected 
with policy as such. 
In  establishing  actual  policy,  the  Commission,  after 
extensive  consultations  with  political  circles,  top  civil 
servants and employers' and workers' organizations, settles 
down to working out its final position with the assistance of 
its own departments only. This involves a series of  meetings, 
often numerous and prolonged, with weeks of careful con-
sideration intervening  between  one  reading  and the  next. 
It was  on this  basis,  for  instance,  that the merged  Com-
mission  prepared  its  opinion  on  the  British  and  other 
applications  for  membership,  its  report  on  Community 
nuclear policy,  and its  proposals  on the reform  of Com-
munity agriculture. 
Once the main lines of its policy have been agreed, on the 
other hand, the Commission has systematic recourse to the 
cooperation  of experts  in  the  member  countries  in  the 
working-out of the practical particulars of the arrangements 
to  be  adopted  or  the  proposals  to  be  submitted.  The 
appropriate Commission departments convene meetings of 
the experts designated by the national civil service depart-
ments concerned, with a  Commission official in the chair. 
The experts' contributions do not commit their respective 
Governments, but as they are sufficiently well-informed as 
to the latter's wishes  and general  position,  they  can give 
their  Commission  counterparts  all  relevant  guidance  in 
their efforts  to  arrive  at formulas  calculated  to meet  the 
11 requirements of the case and to be  generally acceptable to 
the six governments. 
There are a very great many of these meetings of experts, 
and consequently  more  and  more  national  civil  servants 
every year are receiving what can fairly be called a European 
training, while  at the same time a departmental-level dia-
logue is being carried on between European and government 
officials.  In  addition,  members  of  the  Commission  or 
officials from their departments have regular meetings with 
leading representatives of trade unions, employers' federa-
tions,  farmers'  associations,  groups of dealers  and so  on, 
formed in sets of six within the Community. 
Some of these meetings have been institutionalized: thus 
the Council, at the Commission's proposal, has set up, among 
others, a Short-Term Economic Policy Committee, a Budge-
tary-Policy  Committee,  a  Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee and a  Nuclear-Research Advisory Committee, 
consisting of high-level government representatives, and a 
Committee  on Vocational Training and  a  Committee  on 
the Free Movement of Workers, consisting of both govern-
ment experts and representatives of workers' and employers' 
organizations.  The  Commission  itself  has  established  a 
number  of advisory  committees  of the  heads  of all the 
representative  bodies  for  a  particular  sector,  to  deal  for 
example with the main agricultural production sectors  or 
with certain specific social problems. 
In the final stage, the results of these various preparatory 
proceedings  are  laid  before  the  Commission,  which  then 
takes up its stand. Such is  the process by which the Com-
mission frames its proposals for sending to the Council, and 
also, in many cases, regulations or decisions which it could 
issue  on its  own  but  has  thought  well  to  prepare  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  member  countries'  own  civil 
servants. 
How does the Council work? 
Upon receiving from the Commission either a memorandum 
of general scope  or a  proposal on a  particular point, the 
Council first  has  the matter gone into either by  a  special 
committee of senior officials (such as for instance the Special 
Committee  on  Agriculture)  or  by  one  of its  permanent 
working parties (of which there is one for each of the Com-
munity's main fields of activity). The work of these bodies is 
coordinated by the Committee  of Permanent  Represent~­
tives to which reference has already been made. The member 
countries' Permanent Representatives to the Communities 
have the rank of ambassador. 
The  Commission  is  represented  at all  meetings  of the 
working parties, the special committees and the Permanent 
Representatives' Committee, so that the dialogue begun at 
national-expert level can there be carried on higher up the 
scale, with accredited officials holding instructions from their 
governments. 
The Council's decisions can be taken only by the ministers 
themselves. However, on less important matters, where the 
six Permanent Representatives and the Commission's repre-
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sentative  are  unanimously  agreed,  the  decision  will  be 
adopted without debate.  On the other hand, all important 
questions,  and  those  having  political  implications,  are 
discussed in detail in the Council between the ministers and 
the members of the Commission, who attend as of right: it 
is then that the procedures just described come into play. 
The Council's meetings are not merely a matter of form, 
as  ministerial meetings in other international organizations 
sometimes  are:  they  are  working  sessions  in  which  ding-
dong debate is frequently the order of the day and the out-
come  may  well  hang long in  the balance.  They  are con-
stantly being held, and often last some considerable time. 
In 1970, the Council held 41  meetings, taking 75 days in 
all.  Similarly  in  1970,  the  Permanent  Representatives' 
Committee  was  in  session  for  154  days  altogether,  at 
44 meetings. 
When  decision  is  impending  on a  particularly  difficult 
problem,  the  Council  may  have  to  hold  a  "marathon"  .. 
Everyone in the Communities remembers the marathon on 
the agricultural regulations at the end of 1961 and beginning 
of 1962,  which  lasted  nearly  three  weeks.  This  was  the 
longest occasion of its kind, but not the only one. 
Such then is the operation of the Council of Ministers and 
the  Commission,  and  the  Community  generally.  Broadly 
summed  up,  the  mode  of approach  of the  Community 
Institutions may be said to be  characterized by  three out-
standing features. 
•  Firstly, the Institutions, and the Commission in particular, 
are no ivory tower.  On the contrary, they are a forum for 
constant exchanges of views  and suggestions from govern-
ments and civil  services,  members of the European Parlia-
ment and representatives of associations and federations in 
the different sectors of the economy. 
•  Secondly, there are strict legal rules in force which have 
to be faithfully  obeyed, but at the same time the  ongoing 
dialogue  in  progress  creates  the  necessary  Community-
mindedness and mutual trust to ensure the proper degree of 
flexibility. 
•  And lastly,  the economic operators' groups, the Parlia-
ment,  the  national  civil  services  and  the  ministers  have 
genuine confidence in the Commission's impartiality. 
Now that the Common Market and Euratom have been 
in  being for  ten years,  and the  European Coal and Steel 
Community for longer still, and have successfully weathered 
a number of crises, it would seem clear that the Community 
system is  in  fact an effective  one, and that its  Institutions 
are firmly  established and have  taken root among the six 
nations. How fast it develops has of  course always depended 
on how fast the member governments and nations wish  it 
to develop.  Nevertheless, for so  long as  fulfilment of their 
Treaty obligations remains basic to the policy of them all, we 
may  rest  assured  that  whatever  difficulties,  of whatever 
magnitude, may arise in the future can in the end be solved, 
and  the  full  and  final  establishment  of  the  European 
Communities at long last achieved. Community Topics 
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